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32 KANT, 1998: KrV B621–B626.
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33 ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 331f.
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34 ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 215–217.
restricted to the conceptual level. If one wants to prove its existence in reality, a
proof by experience would be necessary. In the respective context, one could
argue that the existence of God is part of the concept of God, but still his real
existence could only be proven under the condition of his existence, which has
to be proven by experience. That, Kant argued, cannot be considered a proof but
is a tautology. An existential judgement is always a synthetic one. And as in
each synthetic judgement, you can negate the predicate without causing a contra-
diction in the subject.32
Ḥā‟erī follows Kant in his argument that one can never infer from an ana- lytic judgement the necessity of the subject‟s existence and that each existential judgement has to be a synthetic one.33 But he opposes Kant‟s conviction that existence can be proven only a posteriori, i.e. by experience, since he denies the consequence that only the existence of sensual objects can be known. Further- more, he criticizes that the manner in which Kant displayed the attempt of a proof of God‟s existence is not correct, since he described it as if it were the proof of a contingent being, namely by trying to relate an object of the sensual world to a concept. That must fail, because God obviously does not belong to the sensual sphere. Furthermore, in the case of God as the supreme Being, relating the concept to an object, i.e. relating Quiddity to Being, is not feasible, since in the case of the supreme Being they are one and the same. Ḥā‟erī argues that Kant is finally restricting Existence to the sensual world, which contradicts the idea of Being representing a comprehensive concept and the totality of reality at the same time.34
This is not an exhaustive discussion of Ḥā‟erī‟s reaction to Kant‟s argument against the ontological proof of God‟s existence, and it is not about who is right and who wrong. Its aim is rather to indicate how knowledge of the intellectual background of a thinker can be helpful in order to understand his reception of someone else‟s thought. In this case, it constitutes an example for a transaction between modern Western and Islamic thought.
Let me evaluate this account of Ḥā‟erī‟s positions: first of all, it has become clear that both thinkers have a different understanding of the meaning of Being. Whereas for Kant Being – or at least the knowledge of it – necessarily cor- responds with objects of the sensual world, for Ḥā‟erī, following his meta-
Ḥā‟erī follows Kant in his argument that one can never infer from an ana- lytic judgement the necessity of the subject‟s existence and that each existential judgement has to be a synthetic one.33 But he opposes Kant‟s conviction that existence can be proven only a posteriori, i.e. by experience, since he denies the consequence that only the existence of sensual objects can be known. Further- more, he criticizes that the manner in which Kant displayed the attempt of a proof of God‟s existence is not correct, since he described it as if it were the proof of a contingent being, namely by trying to relate an object of the sensual world to a concept. That must fail, because God obviously does not belong to the sensual sphere. Furthermore, in the case of God as the supreme Being, relating the concept to an object, i.e. relating Quiddity to Being, is not feasible, since in the case of the supreme Being they are one and the same. Ḥā‟erī argues that Kant is finally restricting Existence to the sensual world, which contradicts the idea of Being representing a comprehensive concept and the totality of reality at the same time.34
This is not an exhaustive discussion of Ḥā‟erī‟s reaction to Kant‟s argument against the ontological proof of God‟s existence, and it is not about who is right and who wrong. Its aim is rather to indicate how knowledge of the intellectual background of a thinker can be helpful in order to understand his reception of someone else‟s thought. In this case, it constitutes an example for a transaction between modern Western and Islamic thought.
Let me evaluate this account of Ḥā‟erī‟s positions: first of all, it has become clear that both thinkers have a different understanding of the meaning of Being. Whereas for Kant Being – or at least the knowledge of it – necessarily cor- responds with objects of the sensual world, for Ḥā‟erī, following his meta-
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705
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http://www.cpm.ehime-u.ac.jp/AkamacHomePage/Akamac_E-text_Links/Kant.html
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http://www.cpm.ehime-u.ac.jp/AkamacHomePage/Akamac_E-text_Links/Kant.html
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