https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/35935/1/07_Seidel_ZORA.pdf
Ḥā‟erī further distinguishes between the “concept of Being” (mafhūm-e
woǧūd) and the “reality of Being” (ḥaqīqat-e woǧūd). Whereas the concept of
Being, as Ḥā‟erī argues, can easily be accessed by human reason as a mental
phenomenon related to every phenomenon in the world, the “reality of Being” as
its correspondent counterpart is therefore not accessible to human reason as
such. In addition this reality of Being has to be understood as a single unity or as
the “unity/unicity of being” (waḥdat-e woǧūd), an idea which has been intro-
duced into the Islamic philosophical tradition by the followers of Ibn ʿArabī. The
idea by which Ḥā‟eri tries to explain the relation between the unity of Being and,
plurality of Being is the concept of taškīk al-wuǧūd „gradation of Being‟. This
concept, which Ḥā‟erī associates with Mollā Ṣadrā, still holds Being as one
single unity, but a unity having different grades of intensity. Ḥā‟erī compares
this to a beam of light, which may appear in different grades of intensity, while it
still remains the same light. All the different existents, which can be observed in
the outside world by way of their representation in the mind, do not differ from
each other in their being existent but rather by their different grades of Being.
The different entities therefore represent different shares of Being (ḫiṣaṣ al-
wuǧūd), like the waves in the ocean, which are existent by one and the same
ocean but appear as different and limited shares of it. What constitutes or frames
a specific share of Being is its Essence or Quiddity. Whereas Being shows that a
certain entity is, Quiddity shows what it is. The mind (ẕihn) has the capacity to
analytically discern these Quiddities from Being and regard them as independent
universals (kullī), but in reality they cannot be separated from Being, since it is
Being which makes them real. Although Being and Quiddity are inseparable
from each other they are not one and the same. Except in the case of the supreme
or ultimate Being, since here Being is the very Essence of itself. This supreme
Being is, furthermore, the only Being which necessarily is existent through itself
(wāǧib al-wuǧūd fī dātihī). All the other beings are contingent or possible beings
and do not necessarily exist through themselves, because in their Quiddities
Being cannot be included, it is added to them by an external cause. This cause,
the necessary and supreme Being, is regularly associated with God, which con-
stantly brings all the existents into being in an creative act.23
READING KANT IN TEHERAN 689
their extensive critical assessment of Western thought (osul-e falsafeh va ravesh-
e realism).15 But it was not before the late 1970s that a traditional Iranian philo-
sopher would study Western philosophy intensively and give a critical
evaluation of some of Kant‟s doctrines by referring to Kant‟s writings
themselves and not merely to some paraphrases of his thought. The first
translation of Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason appeared in the early 1980s.16
Kant and Metaphysics:
Critical Reception among Recent Islamic Philosophers in Iran
Mehdī Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, whose critique of Kant‟s approach to ontology I will dis- cuss in the following, was born in 1923. He had a traditional education in juris- prudence, theology and especially Islamic philosophy. His father was the re- nowned Ayatollah Abdol Karīm Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, the founder of the theological seminars in Qom. From the early 1960s on, he lived for about 20 years in the U.S. and Canada, where he studied Western philosophy and earned a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto in 1979.17 Shortly after the Iranian revolution he re- turned to Iran. There, he soon distanced himself from the political doctrines and practice of Khomeini and his followers, which led to a break of the formerly friendly relationship between him and Khomeini.18
Ḥā‟erīs firsthand access to Western philosophy was unique at that time among traditional Iranian ʿulamā’ trained in Islamic Philosophy. Ḥā‟erīs writ- ings show indeed a considerable acquaintance with the Western texts he deals with. But his aim is not a trans-cultural point of view, but rather an apologetic one, and his comparative discussions are often quite polemic.
Kant and Metaphysics:
Critical Reception among Recent Islamic Philosophers in Iran
Mehdī Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, whose critique of Kant‟s approach to ontology I will dis- cuss in the following, was born in 1923. He had a traditional education in juris- prudence, theology and especially Islamic philosophy. His father was the re- nowned Ayatollah Abdol Karīm Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, the founder of the theological seminars in Qom. From the early 1960s on, he lived for about 20 years in the U.S. and Canada, where he studied Western philosophy and earned a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto in 1979.17 Shortly after the Iranian revolution he re- turned to Iran. There, he soon distanced himself from the political doctrines and practice of Khomeini and his followers, which led to a break of the formerly friendly relationship between him and Khomeini.18
Ḥā‟erīs firsthand access to Western philosophy was unique at that time among traditional Iranian ʿulamā’ trained in Islamic Philosophy. Ḥā‟erīs writ- ings show indeed a considerable acquaintance with the Western texts he deals with. But his aim is not a trans-cultural point of view, but rather an apologetic one, and his comparative discussions are often quite polemic.
-
15 For an evaluation of the importance of this work in the context of Iranian reception of Euro-
pean thought, see GÖSKEN, 2008.
-
16 This translation was prepared by Mīr Šams-ad-Dīn Adīb Solṭānī and appeared shortly after
the Islamic Revolution in 1980, KANT/ADĪB SOLṬĀNĪ. It is no longer available on the Iranian
book market, and to date it has not been translated another time. The main source for the
study of Kant‟s theoretical philosophy in Persian is Ḥaddād ʿĀdel‟s translation of the Pro-
legomena.
-
17 His PhD thesis, written in English, first appeared in Teheran in 1982. In 1992 it was pub-
lished again in New York in the SUNY series in Islam edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who
also wrote a foreword to that edition, see ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1992.
-
18 For an overview of Ḥā‟erī‟s life and work, see HAJATPOUR, 2005: 15–24.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705 690 ROMAN SEIDEL
A few years before his death in 1999, however, he wrote his last mono- graph, ḥekmat va ḥokūmat, which still has no permission to be published in Iran and for that reason was printed in London.19 This work argues for an under- standing of the human as a responsible citizen who has the task of self- determined government as the vicegerent of God on earth. It can, consequently, be regarded as the attempt of a philosophical refutation of the Islamic Republic‟s state-doctrine velāyat-e faqīh, from a rather subjectivist and liberal Islamic per- spective.20 Although this political work might be his most popular one, its under- lying doctrines are already developed by him in his earlier ontological, episte- mological, and ethical works. What is most intriguing about his practical and political thought is that he seems to rely somehow on a Kantian notion of auto- nomy without giving any explicit reference to Kant in that context, whereas in his metaphysical writings, he criticizes Kant directly. It would be most inter- esting to discuss Ḥā‟erī‟s ambiguous relation towards Kant, but in the following I will confine my discussion to metaphysics, since Ḥā‟erī‟s arguments in this respect represent an important strand in the reception of Kant in Iran.
The point of departure in this discussion is the assumed diminution of Being by Kant, which can be especially observed in a chapter of the transcendental dia- lectic of his Critique of Pure Reason, entitled “On the impossibility of an onto- logical proof of the existence of God”.21 For Ḥā‟erī, following a main argument common to the manifold tradition of Islamic philosophy, Being is the fundamen- tal component of reality. He therefore regards, as he repeatedly states, ontology or the study of Being as the very foundation of philosophy.
In the following I will sum up some of Ḥā‟erī‟s ontological views, which he himself understood as essential for all of his philosophical reflections.22 The concept of Being, he argues, is the most comprehensive and universal concept which can possibly be imagined. Any definition of a thing is based on it, while it cannot be defined by anything more universal and is therefore lacking any kind
of definition. The subject of each science is finally defined as something „being‟ and it is therefore grounded in ontology.
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19 ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1995.
-
20 For a study of Ḥā‟erī Yazdī‟s political thought see HAJATPOUR, 1998: 234–304.
-
21 KANT, 1998: KrV A592/B620–A602/B632.
-
22 Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, therefore, discusses his ontological doctrines in almost all of his major works,
these being ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969b; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1360/1981a; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1360/1981b; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1995.
READING KANT IN TEHERAN 691
Ḥā‟erī further distinguishes between the “concept of Being” (mafhūm-e woǧūd) and the “reality of Being” (ḥaqīqat-e woǧūd). Whereas the concept of Being, as Ḥā‟erī argues, can easily be accessed by human reason as a mental phenomenon related to every phenomenon in the world, the “reality of Being” as its correspondent counterpart is therefore not accessible to human reason as such. In addition this reality of Being has to be understood as a single unity or as the “unity/unicity of being” (waḥdat-e woǧūd), an idea which has been intro- duced into the Islamic philosophical tradition by the followers of Ibn ʿArabī. The idea by which Ḥā‟eri tries to explain the relation between the unity of Being and, plurality of Being is the concept of taškīk al-wuǧūd „gradation of Being‟. This concept, which Ḥā‟erī associates with Mollā Ṣadrā, still holds Being as one single unity, but a unity having different grades of intensity. Ḥā‟erī compares this to a beam of light, which may appear in different grades of intensity, while it still remains the same light. All the different existents, which can be observed in the outside world by way of their representation in the mind, do not differ from each other in their being existent but rather by their different grades of Being. The different entities therefore represent different shares of Being (ḫiṣaṣ al- wuǧūd), like the waves in the ocean, which are existent by one and the same ocean but appear as different and limited shares of it. What constitutes or frames a specific share of Being is its Essence or Quiddity. Whereas Being shows that a certain entity is, Quiddity shows what it is. The mind (ẕihn) has the capacity to analytically discern these Quiddities from Being and regard them as independent universals (kullī), but in reality they cannot be separated from Being, since it is Being which makes them real. Although Being and Quiddity are inseparable from each other they are not one and the same. Except in the case of the supreme or ultimate Being, since here Being is the very Essence of itself. This supreme Being is, furthermore, the only Being which necessarily is existent through itself (wāǧib al-wuǧūd fī dātihī). All the other beings are contingent or possible beings and do not necessarily exist through themselves, because in their Quiddities Being cannot be included, it is added to them by an external cause. This cause, the necessary and supreme Being, is regularly associated with God, which con- stantly brings all the existents into being in an creative act.23
Kant‟s discussion of Being in the above mentioned chapter, to which Ḥā‟erī refers almost exclusively, constitutes a double challenge to Ḥā‟erīs ontological doctrine. First, because of Kant‟s argument that Being cannot be a real predicate,
23 For a discussion of the relation between Existence and Quiddity in Islamic philosophy, see NASR, 1989.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705
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19 ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1995.
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