698 ROMAN SEIDEL
exclusively. This has, of course, to be considered an ideal form of free will. In
real life, man is naturally always influenced by personal, emotional, cultural,
social, or historical factors. The task is, therefore, not to get rid of these factors,
but to become aware of them in order to reflect upon the principles of one‟s acts
and to judge their moral status.
Whereas the muʿtazilite idea of free will was based on the argument that humans, in order to act morally, are in the end free to choose whether or not they like to follow divine law, the principles of which can be acknowledged by human reason, Šabestarī, following Kant, goes one step further when he argues that freedom means moral and inner freedom, which includes the capacity of autonomous lawgiving. At the same time, Šabestarī states, man is an imperfect being, neither all-powerful, nor all-knowing, nor even immortal. Faith, therefore, means the search for salvation from one‟s own imperfection in the perfection of God.
Furthermore faith is a conscious decision for stability in God that is based on the inner freedom of man. This does not mean a one-time decision that is valid for all time, but, instead, one that, in face of the constantly changing conditions of life, must be renewed again and again. The faithful must con- tinually reflect upon what belongs to real faith and what does not. This means that they must distinguish between behavior based on a freely made inner decision, which is hence the result of a spiritual or religious experience, another key concept of Šabestarī‟s thought, and conduct that is ultimately a purely superficial imitation of religious acts and truisms. In order to achieve such awareness, one must seriously and openly come to terms with contemporary cri- ticisms of religious thinking – whether coming from Muslim or non-Muslim sources. Šabestarī thus combines highly self-critical and emancipationist aspi- rations with the concept of faith. At this point, we finally face the idea of en- lightenment within the Iranian reception of Kantian thought. It is the demand for being capable of self-criticism, and the task of constantly questioning one‟s own principles – which is one key element of Kant‟s idea of enlightenment.39
Based on these ideas, Šabestarī, like many other liberal thinkers, argues for a more democratic political system, for the implementation of human rights, and for a reconciliation with both religious beliefs in general and the Islamic tradition in particular. In this context, we also encounter discussions trying to prove the necessity or at least reasonability of believing in God‟s existence,
39 For Šabestarīs discussion on freedom and autonomy as a precondition of faith, see for instance ŠABESTARĪ, 1378/1999:11–42.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705 READING KANT IN TEHERAN 699
Whereas the muʿtazilite idea of free will was based on the argument that humans, in order to act morally, are in the end free to choose whether or not they like to follow divine law, the principles of which can be acknowledged by human reason, Šabestarī, following Kant, goes one step further when he argues that freedom means moral and inner freedom, which includes the capacity of autonomous lawgiving. At the same time, Šabestarī states, man is an imperfect being, neither all-powerful, nor all-knowing, nor even immortal. Faith, therefore, means the search for salvation from one‟s own imperfection in the perfection of God.
Furthermore faith is a conscious decision for stability in God that is based on the inner freedom of man. This does not mean a one-time decision that is valid for all time, but, instead, one that, in face of the constantly changing conditions of life, must be renewed again and again. The faithful must con- tinually reflect upon what belongs to real faith and what does not. This means that they must distinguish between behavior based on a freely made inner decision, which is hence the result of a spiritual or religious experience, another key concept of Šabestarī‟s thought, and conduct that is ultimately a purely superficial imitation of religious acts and truisms. In order to achieve such awareness, one must seriously and openly come to terms with contemporary cri- ticisms of religious thinking – whether coming from Muslim or non-Muslim sources. Šabestarī thus combines highly self-critical and emancipationist aspi- rations with the concept of faith. At this point, we finally face the idea of en- lightenment within the Iranian reception of Kantian thought. It is the demand for being capable of self-criticism, and the task of constantly questioning one‟s own principles – which is one key element of Kant‟s idea of enlightenment.39
Based on these ideas, Šabestarī, like many other liberal thinkers, argues for a more democratic political system, for the implementation of human rights, and for a reconciliation with both religious beliefs in general and the Islamic tradition in particular. In this context, we also encounter discussions trying to prove the necessity or at least reasonability of believing in God‟s existence,
39 For Šabestarīs discussion on freedom and autonomy as a precondition of faith, see for instance ŠABESTARĪ, 1378/1999:11–42.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705 READING KANT IN TEHERAN 699
which refer to Kant‟s so-called moral proof of God, an argument which does not
attempt to prove God‟s existence, but to argue for the necessity of the assump-
tion of God‟s existence for the sake of human morality.
Conclusion
Of course, the two examples discussed here do not represent the whole spectrum of the reception of Kant in Iran. There are many other thinkers whom I have not mentioned, and there are other approaches with different foci, which should be taken into account in order to display a more complete picture. But as a preli- minary evaluation of this broad spectrum, one could argue, that it may be roughly divided into two major fields of interest. The first is represented by thinkers who read Kant with a special emphasis on metaphysics. They usually come from a traditional Islamic background and are scholars of Islamic philosophy. In order to defend their tradition, they either try to disprove Kant‟s critical assessment of ontology, or they attempt to reconcile it with their view of Islamic metaphysics. The second field of interest is represented by scholars who are more concerned with Kant‟s practical philosophy, his ethics and political thought. Here again we encounter many different perspectives. There are radical Islamist thinkers who oppose Kant‟s ethics in principle, since he is not building it on divine law,40 other supporters of the Islamic regime, like Haddād ʿĀdel, try to criticize some of Kant‟s doctrines, or they attempt to interpret them in a way that supports their own view of Islamic government. Liberal Islamic or secular intellectuals rather prefer readings supporting the idea of self-determined government and autonomous human subjectivity. For instance, for Šabestarī, as for other Islamic liberals, the adaption of a Kantian account of autonomy does not contradict its reconciliation with the Islamic tradition, where as even secular liberals usually do not refer to the Islamic tradition – which does not necessarily mean that they advocate its abolishment. Although it is often the case a traditional position in metaphysics does not necessarily lead to authoritarian position in politics. Ḥā‟erī, for instance, serves as a good example for a scholar who has quite conservative views regarding Islamic metaphysics, while his political ideas, although being confident to the notion of Islamic government, are dwelling on concepts of freedom and autonomy, whereas some of his contempo-
40 The radical Ayatollah Meṣbāh Yazdī, who categorically refutes Kant‟s ethics in his book falsafe-ye aḫlāq may serve as an example for this category See, Meṣbāh YAZDĪ, 1380/2001.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705
Conclusion
Of course, the two examples discussed here do not represent the whole spectrum of the reception of Kant in Iran. There are many other thinkers whom I have not mentioned, and there are other approaches with different foci, which should be taken into account in order to display a more complete picture. But as a preli- minary evaluation of this broad spectrum, one could argue, that it may be roughly divided into two major fields of interest. The first is represented by thinkers who read Kant with a special emphasis on metaphysics. They usually come from a traditional Islamic background and are scholars of Islamic philosophy. In order to defend their tradition, they either try to disprove Kant‟s critical assessment of ontology, or they attempt to reconcile it with their view of Islamic metaphysics. The second field of interest is represented by scholars who are more concerned with Kant‟s practical philosophy, his ethics and political thought. Here again we encounter many different perspectives. There are radical Islamist thinkers who oppose Kant‟s ethics in principle, since he is not building it on divine law,40 other supporters of the Islamic regime, like Haddād ʿĀdel, try to criticize some of Kant‟s doctrines, or they attempt to interpret them in a way that supports their own view of Islamic government. Liberal Islamic or secular intellectuals rather prefer readings supporting the idea of self-determined government and autonomous human subjectivity. For instance, for Šabestarī, as for other Islamic liberals, the adaption of a Kantian account of autonomy does not contradict its reconciliation with the Islamic tradition, where as even secular liberals usually do not refer to the Islamic tradition – which does not necessarily mean that they advocate its abolishment. Although it is often the case a traditional position in metaphysics does not necessarily lead to authoritarian position in politics. Ḥā‟erī, for instance, serves as a good example for a scholar who has quite conservative views regarding Islamic metaphysics, while his political ideas, although being confident to the notion of Islamic government, are dwelling on concepts of freedom and autonomy, whereas some of his contempo-
40 The radical Ayatollah Meṣbāh Yazdī, who categorically refutes Kant‟s ethics in his book falsafe-ye aḫlāq may serve as an example for this category See, Meṣbāh YAZDĪ, 1380/2001.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705
700 ROMAN SEIDEL
raries would support most of his metaphysical positions but harshly oppose his
political ones. Therefore the adherence to Islamic metaphysics or the Islamic
tradition in general does not necessarily lead to a refutation of Kant‟s practical
thought and vice versa.
To conclude: What does the examination of Iranian accounts of Kant‟s writings demonstrate? First of all, it demonstrates that his philosophy is being studied by a wide range of scholars in very different ways with different purposes and in different contexts. It shows that the comparison with the tradi- tion of Mollā Ṣadrā, for instance, might lead to interesting new perspectives. But beyond that, it may support an awareness for the fact that no one, may he or she be arguing from a Western or a non-Western intellectual context, owns the au- thentic reading of Kant, that even efforts to present something like the essence of Kant‟s philosophy are but specific readings of his writings stressing certain aspects and marginalizing others. Some of them will certainly seem more rea- sonable than others, but each of them shows that there is always a specific intellectual context and a specific intention behind an interpretation.
Overemphasizing authenticity bears the risk that one ends up in essentialist discourse. Speaking of something like the German or the Iranian philosophy often means – at least implicitly – promoting one specific strand of thought as being the authentic one. But this means neglecting the fact that in each cultural tradition of thinking we encounter a variety of approaches to philosophy existing simultaneously. The fact that one may be predominant in a specific period does not make it more authentic than others. This is not meant to simply equate plu- rality and cultural differences, but to look out for the significance of specific differences and similarities in the context of a specific philosophical issue, rather than to link difference in general to a certain, say the Iranian, culture. Therefore, I would prefer to speak of several traditions of thinking and to identify them with regard to their systematic foundation or their ideological context rather than to a vague cultural background. Since culture seems to be much too broad and much too complex a concept, a comparison between different specific traditions of thought, be they from one or from various geographical origins, or an analysis of their potential mutual influence, seem to me much more fruitful. Analyzing the reception of Kant in Iran could be but one example of a kind of comparative approach which might encourage more constructive dialogues among philoso- phers from different intellectual origins bringing different traditions of thought, rather than different cultures, onto the stage of discourse. After all, this kind of active exchange of ideas across the ideological border between a “Western” and no western "
To conclude: What does the examination of Iranian accounts of Kant‟s writings demonstrate? First of all, it demonstrates that his philosophy is being studied by a wide range of scholars in very different ways with different purposes and in different contexts. It shows that the comparison with the tradi- tion of Mollā Ṣadrā, for instance, might lead to interesting new perspectives. But beyond that, it may support an awareness for the fact that no one, may he or she be arguing from a Western or a non-Western intellectual context, owns the au- thentic reading of Kant, that even efforts to present something like the essence of Kant‟s philosophy are but specific readings of his writings stressing certain aspects and marginalizing others. Some of them will certainly seem more rea- sonable than others, but each of them shows that there is always a specific intellectual context and a specific intention behind an interpretation.
Overemphasizing authenticity bears the risk that one ends up in essentialist discourse. Speaking of something like the German or the Iranian philosophy often means – at least implicitly – promoting one specific strand of thought as being the authentic one. But this means neglecting the fact that in each cultural tradition of thinking we encounter a variety of approaches to philosophy existing simultaneously. The fact that one may be predominant in a specific period does not make it more authentic than others. This is not meant to simply equate plu- rality and cultural differences, but to look out for the significance of specific differences and similarities in the context of a specific philosophical issue, rather than to link difference in general to a certain, say the Iranian, culture. Therefore, I would prefer to speak of several traditions of thinking and to identify them with regard to their systematic foundation or their ideological context rather than to a vague cultural background. Since culture seems to be much too broad and much too complex a concept, a comparison between different specific traditions of thought, be they from one or from various geographical origins, or an analysis of their potential mutual influence, seem to me much more fruitful. Analyzing the reception of Kant in Iran could be but one example of a kind of comparative approach which might encourage more constructive dialogues among philoso- phers from different intellectual origins bringing different traditions of thought, rather than different cultures, onto the stage of discourse. After all, this kind of active exchange of ideas across the ideological border between a “Western” and no western "
704 ROMAN SEIDEL
MAKDISI, Georges
1981 The Rise of Colleges Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West.
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press. MEṢBĀH YAZDĪ, Moḥammad Taqī
1380/2001 Falsafe-ye aḫlāq. Teheran: Šarkat-e ʿāp va našr-e beyn ol-mellalī. MOǦTAHEDĪ, Karīm
1384/2005–6 Āšenā’ī-ye īrānīyān bā falsafehā-ye ǧadīd-e ġarb. Teheran:
Pažūhešgāh-e farhang va andīše-ye eslāmī / mo‟assase-ye moṭāleʿāt-e
tārīḫ-e moʿāṣer. MOVAḤED, Żīyā [ed.]
2007 Maǧmūʿe-ye maqālāt-e 'Semīnār-e Kānt. Mo’assase-ye pažūhešī-ye ḥekmat va falsafe-ye Ìrān 'Moṭāleʿāt-e enteqādī dar falsafe-ye Kānt' (Teherān 28-30 Āẕar 1383). [Proceedings of the Kant‟s Seminar. Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Critical Studies of Kant‟s Philosophy (Tehran, 18–20 December 2004); pers./engl.]. Teheran: Mo‟assase-ye pažūhešī-ye ḥekmat va falsafeh.
NAGEL, Tilman
1994 Geschichte der islamischen Theologie. Von Mohammed bis zur
Gegenwart. München: C.H. Beck. NASR, Seyyed Hossein
1989 “Existence (wujūd) and Quiddity (māhiyyah) in Islamic Philosophy.” International Philosophical Quarterly 29.4 (1989): 409–428.
NEUMANN, Hardy
2006 Die neue Seinsbestimmung in der reinen theoretischen Philosophie
Kants: Das Sein als Position. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. RAHMAN, Fazlur
1975 The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī), Albany: SUNY Press.
RINGER, Monica M.
2001 Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar
Iran, Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers. RIZVI, Sajjad H. [RIZVI, Saǧǧad H.]
2007 Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2009 Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics. Modulation of Being. London/New York: Routledge Chapman.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705
1981 The Rise of Colleges Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West.
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press. MEṢBĀH YAZDĪ, Moḥammad Taqī
1380/2001 Falsafe-ye aḫlāq. Teheran: Šarkat-e ʿāp va našr-e beyn ol-mellalī. MOǦTAHEDĪ, Karīm
1384/2005–6 Āšenā’ī-ye īrānīyān bā falsafehā-ye ǧadīd-e ġarb. Teheran:
Pažūhešgāh-e farhang va andīše-ye eslāmī / mo‟assase-ye moṭāleʿāt-e
tārīḫ-e moʿāṣer. MOVAḤED, Żīyā [ed.]
2007 Maǧmūʿe-ye maqālāt-e 'Semīnār-e Kānt. Mo’assase-ye pažūhešī-ye ḥekmat va falsafe-ye Ìrān 'Moṭāleʿāt-e enteqādī dar falsafe-ye Kānt' (Teherān 28-30 Āẕar 1383). [Proceedings of the Kant‟s Seminar. Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Critical Studies of Kant‟s Philosophy (Tehran, 18–20 December 2004); pers./engl.]. Teheran: Mo‟assase-ye pažūhešī-ye ḥekmat va falsafeh.
NAGEL, Tilman
1994 Geschichte der islamischen Theologie. Von Mohammed bis zur
Gegenwart. München: C.H. Beck. NASR, Seyyed Hossein
1989 “Existence (wujūd) and Quiddity (māhiyyah) in Islamic Philosophy.” International Philosophical Quarterly 29.4 (1989): 409–428.
NEUMANN, Hardy
2006 Die neue Seinsbestimmung in der reinen theoretischen Philosophie
Kants: Das Sein als Position. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. RAHMAN, Fazlur
1975 The Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī), Albany: SUNY Press.
RINGER, Monica M.
2001 Education, Religion, and the Discourse of Cultural Reform in Qajar
Iran, Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers. RIZVI, Sajjad H. [RIZVI, Saǧǧad H.]
2007 Mullā Ṣadrā Shīrāzī: His Life and Works and the Sources for Safavid Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2009 Mullā Ṣadrā and Metaphysics. Modulation of Being. London/New York: Routledge Chapman.
AS/EA LXIV•3•2010, S. 681–705
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